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Abstract
We have studied here the self-organising features of the dynamics of a model market, where
the agents ‘trade’ for a single commodity with their money. The model market consists of
fixed numbers of economic agents, money supply and commodity. We demonstrate that the
model, apart from showing a self-organising behaviour, indicates a crucial role for the money
supply in the market and also its self-organising behaviour is seen to be significantly affected
when the money supply becomes less than the optimum. We also observed that this optimal
money supply level of the market depends on the amount of ‘frustration’ or scarcity in the
commodity market.
PACS No. : 87.23.Ge, 05.90.+m, 89.90.+n, 02.50.-r
I. Introduction and the model
An economic market is perhaps the most commonly encountered self-organising system or
network, whose dynamics profoundly affects us all. Its dynamics is no doubt very intrigu-
ing. In fact Adam Smith in 1776 first made the formal notice of a self-organising aspect,
which he called the ‘invisible hand’ effect, of the market consisting of selfish agents [1, 2].
Although it still remains illusive to demonstrate that a pure competitive market, consisting
of agents pursuing pure self-interest, can self-organise or reach (dynamic) equilibrium, the
mainstream economists seem to consider it to be true in principle (a matter of faith?) [2]. In
various statistical physics models of interacting systems or networks, such self-organisation
has indeed been demonstrated to emerge in the global aspects of the system which consists
of a large number of simple dynamical elements having local (in time and space) interactions
and dynamics [3]. It was also noted by the economists long time back that this dynamics,
which takes the system to equilibrium, is greatly facilitated by ‘paper money’ (rather than
the direct commodity exchanges as in barter economy) which does not have any value of its
own, but rather can be considered as a good ‘lubricant’ in the econodynamics [2]. Consistent
with this analogy, it was also seen that when the (paper) money supply gets changed, it does
not just scale up (for increased money supply) or down (for decreased money supply) the
commodity prices, the (self-organising) dynamics towards equilibrium gets seriously affected
[4].
We have studied here the self-organising features of the dynamics of a model market,
where the agents ‘trade’ for a single commodity with their money. We demonstrate that the
model, apart from having a self-organising behaviour, has got a crucial role for the money
supply in the market and that its self-organising behaviour is significantly affected when
the money supply becomes less than the optimum. We also observed that this optimal
money supply level of the market depends on the amount of ‘frustration’ or scarcity in the
commodity market. In our model, each agent having commodity less than the ‘subsistence’
level trades with any other having more than the ‘subsistence’ level, in exchange of its money.
Specifically, we consider a closed economic system consisting of N economic agents, each
economic agent i have at any time money mi and commodity qi, such that (
∑N
i=1mi = M
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and
∑N
i=1 qi = Q), where N , M and Q are fixed. The ‘subsistence’ commodity level for each
agent is q0. Hence at any time an agent having qi < q0 will attempt to trade, utilising its
money mi at that time, with agents having commodity more than q0, and will purchase to
make its commodity level q0 (and no-further), if its money permits. The agents with qi > q0
will sell-off the excess amount to such ‘hungry’ agents having qi < q0, and will attempt to
maximize its wealth (money). This dynamics is local in time (‘daily’) and it stops eventually
when no further trade is possible satisfying the above criteria. We introduce an ‘annual’ or
long-time dynamics when some random fluctuations in all the agents’ money and commodity
occur. Annually, each agent gets a minor reshuffle of the money and its commodity (e.g.,
perhaps due to the noise in the stock market and in the harvest due to the changes in the
weather respectively). This (short and long time) combined dynamics is similar to that of
the ‘sand-pile’ models studied extensively in recent times [3]. The price of the commodity
does not change in our model with the money supply M in the market; it remains fixed
here (at unity). We look for the steady state features of this market; in particular, the
distributions P (m) and P (q) of the money and commodity respectively among the agents.
We have investigated how many agents P (q0) can satisfy their basic needs through this
dynamics, i.e., can reach the subsistence level q0, as function of the money supply M for
both unfrustrated (g < 1) (where g = q0/ < q > and < q > = Q/N is the average commodity
in the market) and the frustrated (g > 1) cases of the commodity market. We observed that
an optimum amount M0 of money supply is required for evolving the market towards the
maximum possible value of P (q0). This optimum value of money M0 is observed to decrease
with increase in g in the market.
II. Unlimited money supply and limited supply of commodity :
Here, we consider the money supplyM in the market to be infinitely large and it therefore
drops out from any consideration. The dynamics is then entirely governed by the commodity
distribution among agents: for agents with qi < q0, the attempt will be to find another trade
partner having qi > q0; and having found such partners, through random search in the
market, trades occur for mutual benefit (for the selling agent we still consider the extra
money from trade to be important). The system thus evolves towards its steady state, as
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the fixed-point feature of the short-time or daily dynamics gets affected by the random noise
reshuffling in the commodity of each agent. This reshuffling essentially induces Gibbs-like
distribution [5, 6]. The trade dynamics is clearly motivated or ‘directed’. We look for the
combined effect on the steady state distribution of commodity P (q), which is independent
of the initial commodity distribution among the agents.
For the unfrustrated case (g < 1), where all the agents can be satisfied, the typical
distributions P (q) are shown in Fig. 1 for different values of g. We see that the P (q)
is Gibbs-like (P (q) = A exp(−q/ < q >) and A = 1 − g), for q > q0, while P (q0) = g
(as shown in the inset). One can easily explain these observations using the fact that the
cumulative effect of the long-time randomization gives Gibbs distribution (exp(−q/ < q >)
for all q). We then estimate the final steady state distribution P (q) from the additional
effect of the short-time dynamics on this (long-time dynamics induced) Gibbs distribution.
All the agents with q < q0 manage here to acquire q0-level of commodity (as g < 1 and
everybody has enough money to purchase the required amount). Their number is then given
by N
−
=
∫ q0
0 exp(−q)dq. They require the total amount of commodity q0N−. The amount
of commodity already available with them is given by Q
−
=
∫ q0
0 q exp(−q)dq. The excess
amount required Qdemand = q0N− − Q− has to come from the agents having q > q0. The
average of the excess amount of commodity of the agents who are above the q0-line is given
by < qexcess >= (1 − Q− − (1 − N−)q0)/(1 − N−). The number of agents who supply the
Qdemand amount is given by N+ = Qdemand/ < qexcess >. This gives P (q0) = N− + N+= g.
We can easily determine the prefactor of the final steady state distribution P (q) for q > q0,
A = 1− g from the conservation of total number of agents and total commodity.
For the frustrated case (g > 1), the results are shown in Fig. 2. A similar calculation for
P (q0) is done as follows: N+ =
∫
∞
q0
exp(−q)dq is the number of people above the q0-line who
will sell off their excess amount of commodity to come to q0-level, Q+ =
∫
∞
q0
q exp(−q)dq is
the commodity of the agents above the q0-level. Then the supplied amount of commodity to
the agents below the q0-line is Qsupply = Q+ − q0N+. The average of the deficit commodity,
< qdeficit >= ((1−N+)q0 − 1 +Q+)/(1−N+). Hence, the number of agents who will reach
q0-level from below is N− = Qsupply/ < qdeficit > , so that P (q0) = N++N− =g exp(−g)/(g−
3
1 + exp(−g)). A comparison of this estimate for P (q0) with g is also shown in the inset of
Fig. 2. It may be mentioned that in absence of the strict Gibbs distribution for P (q) (
q < q0), the above expression for P (q0) is somewhat approximate.
III. Limited money supply and limited supply of commodity :
When the money supply is limited, the self-organising behaviour is significantly affected
and the fraction of agents who can secure q0 amount of commodity for themselves P (q0), does
not always reach its maximum possible value (as suggested by the amount of commodity
available in the market). For all values of g, as we increase the money supply in the market
M , P (q0) increases and then after a certain amount M0, it saturates. In Fig. 3., we have
shown how the quantity P (q0) varies with M for different values of g (for g > 1 only, as
we are more interested in the frustrated case). We define M0 to be the optimum amount
of money supply needed for the smooth functioning of the market. We also observed that
this optimal money supply level of the market depends on the amount of frustration g in
the commodity market. In the inset, the variation of M0 with g is shown for the frustrated
case (g > 1) only.
IV. Summary and Concluding remarks
We have studied here the steady state distributions P (m) and P (q) of money and com-
modity in a model consisting of fixed number of agents N , total commodity Q and total
money M in the market. Only one commodity is considered for trade and its price is taken
to be fixed (at unity) and it does not change with the money supply in the market. The
subsistence commodity level q0 of all the agents are the same and each of them would like
to purchase the deficit amount (q0 − qi) from the agents having qi > q0, in exchange of its
own money. Apart from the basic urge to reach the subsistence level (if originally below it),
all the agents would like to maximize their wealth or money. The second instinct allows the
agents with excess commodity (over q0) to find hungry partners and to sell-off the excess.
The dynamics considered here is the local or short time (or daily) dynamics. Additionally, we
consider a long time (or yearly) dynamics, which reshuffles mildly but randomly the amounts
of money and commodity of each agent (due to, say, the fluctuations in the stock market
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and in the harvest, etc.). The resulting distributions follow from the successive applications
of the local directed dynamics, followed by a randomization in the quantities. We consider
both the cases: unfrustrated case (g < 1) where in principle every agent can be satisfied,
and frustrated case (g > 1) where not everyone can be satisfied. We concentrate mainly on
the quantity P (q0) which gives the steady density of agents in the market who can satisfy
the basic requirement of commodity. As is obvious, this quantity is most significant in the
frustrated cases (g > 1) where there is not enough commodity in the market to satisfy the
basic requirements (q0) for everyone. We study how this quantity grows or the distribution
of commodity among the agents is facilitated, with the supply of money M in the market.
We see that P (q0) = g for g < 1 and P (q0) ≃ g exp(−g)/(g − 1 + exp(−g)) for g > 1,
where the money supply M is much greater than M0, the optimal money required in the
market. We see that these expressions for the P (q0) for M > M0 can be easily explained
(see section II) assuming that the resulting distribution is Gibbs like for q > q0 (for g < 1)
and a mean-field picture (for g > 1).
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Figure captions
Fig. 1 : The distributions of commodity P (q) for different values of g for N = 1000, Q = 1,
M = 100 (M > M0(g)), for the unfrustrated case (g < 1). The steady-state distribution of
commodity P (q) is Gibbs-like: P (q) = A exp(−q/ < q >) with A = 1 − g, for q > q0. The
inset shows the linear variation of P (q0) with g (P (q0) = g).
Fig. 2 : The distributions of commodity P (q) for different values of g for N = 1000, Q = 1,
M = 100 (M > M0(g)), for the frustrated case (g > 1). The variation of P (q0) with g is
shown in the inset where the theoretical estimate (P (q) = g exp(−g)/(g − 1 + exp(−g))) is
also indicated by the solid line.
Fig. 3 : The variation of quantity P (q0) with M for different values of g in the frustrated
cases (g > 1). The inset shows the variation of M0 with g.
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